A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model
Abstract
For a two-player bargaining model, Mao (2016) extends the alternating offers procedure of Rubinstein (1982) to more general procedures and explores which payoff outcomes are feasible, in the sense that they can be supported by some procedures as subgame perfect equilibria. In this paper, we define a special class of procedures called normalized procedures. We show that while the set of normalized procedures can yield all feasible partitions, none of its proper subsets can do so.
Type
Publication
In Economics Letters
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Tianyu Zhang
Ph.D. Student in Machine Learning
My research interests include Algorithmic Game Theory, Agent-based Model Simulator, AI for Climate Change, Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning, Self-supervised Learning, Domain Adaptation. I am still exploring and learning slowly.